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The Philosopher as a Child of His
Own Time
Rorty on Irony and Creativity
Javier Toro
The community stagnates without the impulse of
the individual. The impulse dies away without the
sympathy of the community.
William James, “Great Men, Great Thoughts, and
the Environment,” Atlantic Monthly, October, 1880.
 
Introduction
1 By the time Richard Rorty wrote Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity he was convinced that it
was impossible to fulfill his adolescent yearning of holding “reality and justice in a single
vision,”1 fusing  private  enlightenment  with  public  justice.  This  yearning  is  better
represented in the Platonic tradition which holds that there is something necessary and
transcendental about human nature and values, that solidarity is based on objectivity, not
the other way around:
The attempt to fuse the public and the private lies behind both Plato’s attempt to
answer the question ‘Why is it in one’s interest to be just?’ and Christianity’s claim
that  perfect  self-realization  can  be  attained  through  service  to  others.  Such
metaphysical or theological attempts to unite a striving for perfection with a sense
of community require us to acknowledge a common human nature. They ask us to
believe that […] the springs of private fulfillment and of human solidarity are the
same. (Rorty 1989: xiii)
2 According to Rorty, such Platonic yearning is at the core of all our western philosophic
tradition in the sense that  it  has been,  in part,  due to this  yearning that  the grand
philosophical  systems  (such  as  the  Cartesian  and  Kantian  quests  for  certainty)  have
arisen. Such yearning is not to be ignored by the philosopher, since it seems to stand
amidst all of philosophy’s enterprises.
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3 As a reaction to this impulse, Rorty claims that it is not necessary to marry justice and
reality,  fuse the public  and the private;  in other  words,  it  is  not  necessary to  make
coincide our moral responsibilities to others with our most private yearnings, regardless
that such yearnings be entirely philosophical or simply aesthetical (like one’s egotistical
love to wild orchids,  or  Proust’s  novels).  As  he acknowledges in an autobiographical
passage:
One should try to abjure the temptation to tie in one’s moral responsibilities to
other people with one’s relation with whatever idiosyncratic things or persons one
loves  with  all  one’s  heart  and  soul  and  mind…  The  two  will,  for  some  people,
coincide […] but they need not co-incide, and one should not try too hard to make
them do so (Rorty 1999: 13).
4 For  Rorty,  the  most  valuable  philosophers  and  intellectuals  –  or  at  least  those  who
provide us  with tools  to  cope with our  reality  and whose vocabulary has  eventually
become the canon – are those historicists who acknowledge the contingency of their
thought and vocabularies. The imaginative creativity of such philosophers is not very far
from the creative drive of the poet; in fact, in different places Rorty sees the philosopher
as constructing a poetic narrative.2 The best example of this sort of philosopher-as-poet
is, Rorty tells us, Nietzsche, who
by  treating  Socrates  as  one  more  mythmaker  rather  than  as  someone  who
employed reason to break free of myth, he lets us see Parmenides and Plato as all-
too-strong poets. (Rorty 2007: 110)
5 Heidegger  and Wittgenstein are  also  good examples  of  the  type of  ironist-historicist
philosopher which Rorty had in mind, because these two authors were mainly concerned
with  self-creation  and  private  perfection  instead  of  justice  and  general  well-being.
Nietzsche, Proust, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida and Foucault, among many others,
are  grouped  together  by  Rorty  as  the  kind  of  intellectual  who  has  criticized  final
vocabularies  and  has  created  its  own vocabulary,  but  all  in  account  of  private  self-
fulfillment.  On  the  other  hand,  other  historicist  authors  such  as  Marx,  Dewey,  and
Habermas,  who also created their own vocabulary,  saw such self-concern as a selfish
intellectual exercise which needed to be abandoned for the search of social welfare and
public justice.
6 Rorty – especially in his book Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity – doesn’t try to synthesize
both groups of historicist writers; rather, he insists on giving up such efforts and live
happily  with  the  split  result.  Such  outcome  is  a  toolbox  which  helps  us  cope  with
different and limited aspects of  our reality,  not all of  it.  Thus,  Nabokov’s novels and
Wittgenstein’s philosophy help us cope with certain aspects of our reality, in dealing with
certain limited problems. At the same time, Habermas’ and Dewey’s books come handy in
some cases (namely, when it comes to understand the struggles of societies’ quest for
certainty  throughout  history),  but  completely  irrelevant  when  it  comes  to  give  us
inspiration for our private self-creation.
7 The moral behind Rorty’s ironic philosophy is that our lives make much more sense when
we drop the Platonic yearning for metaphysical unity of reality. The outcome is, though,
that our sense of moral responsibility might not have a transcendental and rational basis,
but it is there nevertheless, since it is what comes naturally for us to do.
8 In what follows, I will argue against such detached view of philosophical creativity. First, I
will argue that Rorty’s ironist contradicts the image of the pragmatist philosopher which
Rorty  himself  shared  with  the classical  pragmatists.  Then,  I  will  point  that  Rorty’s
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insistence on the dichotomy between the public and the private is exaggerated and fails
to acknowledge the deep entanglement between the two. However, in this essay I want to
rescue what is valuable from Rorty’s philosophy and read between the lines, trying to
form a general view of his philosophy, rather than focusing on some unfortunate lines of
his; thus, in some sense, I will try to save Rorty from himself. This way of reading Rorty is
not that far from John Horton’s way of interpreting the American philosopher, since he
suggests an approach which
involves treating Rorty in a more receptive spirit, one which involves the benefit of
the doub and which genuinely seeks to understand what it is that he is trying to say
and why.  It  means treating Rorty in the spirit  in which he often treats  others-
taking up what is useful, pursuing what looks promising and rejecting or passing
over what looks to be his less impressive lines of thought. (Horton 2001: 16)
9 This approach, though, as Horton also points out, does not imply giving up on critical
rigor and analysis and does not mean giving up an effort to find internal difficulties in
Rorty’s  writings.  However,  it  means  to  treat  the  American  pragmatist  as  if  he  had
something really valuable to say, something which, to follow Rorty’s method, must be
redescribed.
 
The Philosopher and His Context
10 By equating philosophy’s creative drive to aesthetic and artistic creativity, Rorty wants us
to read Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein as if they were completely detached from
their  humanity  when  it  comes  to  write  philosophy.  Thus,  in  his  essay  “Cavell  on
Skepticism” (Rorty 1982), Rorty claims that Wittgenstein would have written pretty much
the same books even if he hadn’t had so much contact with the British philosophers for
whom the problem of the external world was the main problem of philosophy back then:
Had  Wittgenstein  stayed  in  Central  Europe,  he  would  have  met  philosophy
professors who worried more about the transcendental standpoint and less about
skepticism. But he would probably have written pretty much the same books, and
directed our attention to the same things. (Rorty 1982: 177)
11 Likewise, Rorty tells us a similar story of Heidegger, for whom he imagines a possible
world where the German philosopher becomes more sensible to the Jewish Holocaust, and
thus  avoids  the  attraction  of  Nazism;  nevertheless,  in  this  possible  world  Heidegger
writes almost the same books as he does in our actual world.3
12 For Rorty, the philosopher, just as it happens with the artist, uses imagination more than
reason, feeling more than logic.  That is why Rorty believes pragmatism to be closely
linked with romanticism, since
These two movements are both reactions against the idea that there is something
non-human out there with which human beings need to get in touch (Rorty 2007:
105).
13 This claim is closely linked to his claims against representationalism and metaphysical
realism: namely, since the task of the philosopher is not to guide our knowledge to the
true essence of things – for language is a tool which helps us cope with the environment
rather than accurately penetrate it and represent it –, then, the remaining task for the
philosopher  is  to  enhance  our  imagination  and  direct  our  attention  to  unnoticed
problems. For achieving such task the philosopher – just as the creative artist – invents
his own vocabulary, since the current vocabulary of his community doesn’t allow him to
cope adequately with whatever he considers to be a problem.
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14 However, the claim that a philosopher would have pretty much written the same books as
he did had he lived in different conditions (either place or time conditions) is a claim
which lacks  empirical  or  any sort  of  evidence;  it  is  an speculative  claim,  for  which,
nevertheless, Rorty argues for. As opposed to this, I claim that all sensible evidence speaks
against such claim; thus, when we study the history of ideas, one realizes that all ideas,
even  philosophical  ones,  belong  to  a  certain  historic  and  contingent  paradigm  and
conceptual scheme.4 By claiming this I hope not to be understood as an all-out relativist
for whom all truth-claims would merely depend on a discourse. The idea of Truth (absolute
or relative) is something that must go by once we reject the Platonic picture of unity of
reality. Instead, as pragmatists such as Rorty himself and Hilary Putnam have taught us,
the pragmatist embraces the idea of diverse valid descriptions and conceptual relativity.
According  to  this  internal way  to  understanding  philosophy,  one  has  that  what
philosophers do is to
help you hold your time in thought. But we are not the people to come to if you
want confirmation that the things you love with all your heart are central to the
structure of the universe, or that your sense of moral responsibility is ‘rational and
objective’ rather than ‘just’ a result of how you were brought up. (Rorty 1999: 20)
15 It would be contradictory for Rorty to hold that the philosopher can hold his time in
thought and at the same time be outside of time himself. Such claim is not far from the
metaphysical claim (held by philosophers with whom Rorty strongly disagreed, such as
Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel) that the philosopher should hold reality from a
privileged view from nowhere. However, such is the image of the philosopher that one has
after reading the above passages from Rorty.
16 This  view  of  a  detached  philosopher  tells  us  a  great  deal  of  Rorty’s  idea  of  the
philosophical  enterprise,  namely,  an ahistorical  quest  for  certainty  which deals  with
eternal problems that have little importance to mankind’s lives. However, one must ask
at this point, is this really Rorty’s idea of philosophy?
17 When Rorty speaks of the philosopher as a detached individual, one has the idea that he
would not be concerned with problems from its own time, but rather with ahistorical
problems. Thus, the image that we have is of an individual completely detached from his
history and situations when it comes to write philosophy. If this is so, then Rorty never
fully  took  enough  distance  from  the  analytic  philosopher’s  yearning  of  “keeping
philosophy  pure.”  According  to  this  picture,  the  little  and  –  only  apparently  –
insignificant contingencies in Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s lives (public and private)
accounted for nothing in their philosophical creativity; for them life was something that
happened outside of philosophy.5
 
The Contingency of Philosophical Problems
18 This way of understanding contingency and creativity goes far beyond the consequences
which Rorty himself would have wanted to acknowledge. As any reader of Rorty knows,
he didn’t consider philosophical problems to have an eternal and never-changing nature.
Instead, for him a philosophical problem was a way of speaking which had relevance up
to  a  certain  historical  moment;  after  that  moment  such  way  of  speaking  became
irrelevant.6 I don’t think that he would have been happy with the image of a historically
detached philosopher, and I really don’t think that his Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity was
written with such an image in mind.
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19 However,  one  cannot  escape  a  feeling  of  contradiction  in  Rorty’s  writing  when one
compares what he said about the contingency of the philosopher’s context when it comes
to write philosophy with what he said about the contingency of philosophical problems.
The feeling of contradiction is explicit because Rorty agrees with Dewey that
When  it  is  acknowledged  that  under  disguise  of  dealing  with  ultimate  reality,
philosophy  has  been  occupied  with  the  precious  values  embedded  in  social
traditions,  that it  has sprung from a clash of social  ends and from a conflict  of
inherited institutions with incompatible contemporary tendencies, it will be seen
that the task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social and moral
strifes of their own day.7 (Dewey 1982: 94)
20 Further,  Rorty criticizes those contemporary philosophers such as Michael Ayers and
Margaret Wilson who advocate an “absolutist stance” regarding philosophical problems,
which amounts to
the conviction that the problems one addresses are inescapable once one begins to
reflect – where ‘philosophical reflection’ denotes the activity of reconciling those
persistent  intuitions  that  survive  changes  in  sociocultural  circumstance.  (Rorty
1998: 277)
21 How are we to put together the last two quotations with the former which claimed that
Had  Wittgenstein  stayed  in  Central  Europe,  he  would  have  met  philosophy
professors who worried more about the transcendental standpoint and less about
skepticism. But he would probably have written pretty much the same books, and
directed our attention to the same things. (Rorty 1982: 177)
22 As I said above, I would like to take Rorty in his own words and at the same time be fair to
his conception of philosophy as a whole. That is why I insist that this last quotation is an
unfortunate leftover of Rorty’s analytic past.
23 One must remember that Rorty viewed philosophy as cultural politics, an enterprise which
is set to modify and radically change the self-images of a given society.8 Thus, I want to
preserve  Rorty’s  idea  of  philosophy as  a  toolbox  and  at  the  same  time  uphold  the
metaphor of the philosopher as a child of his own time.9
24 The idea of a “detached” philosopher, occupied with eternal and impersonal problems, in
other  words,  the  idea  of  philosophical  writing  done sub  specie  aeternitatis,  was  the
dominant  idea  regarding  philosophical  creativity  until  the  second  half  of  the  20th
century. And in some respects such idea still presents itself as compelling, since many of
the  problems  which troubled  Plato  still  trouble  sensible  philosophers.  However,  this
doesn’t  necessarily  mean  that  philosophical  problems  are  eternal,  timeless,  and
inescapable. Rather, as Rorty understood it, philosophical problems are of such nature
that allows for permanent reinterpretations and recontextualizations:
Dewey agreed with Hegel  that  philosophers  were never going to be able  to  see
things  under  the  aspect  of  eternity;  they  should  instead  try  to  contribute  to
humanity’s ongoing conversation about what to do with itself. (Rorty 2007: ix)
25 The  importance  of  philosophical  problems  is  that  they  help  us  keeping  an  ongoing
interesting conversation, a conversation that still,  to our own day, tells us something
about our lives. Therefore, it is a mistake to reinterpret and recontextaulize the problems
of philosophy ahistorically,  without an appeal  to their  context.  The idea of  a “pure”
philosophical problem, clean from the contingencies of its day and time, reminds us of
the  idea  of  the  thing  in  itself,  of  something  which  remains  untouched  by  human
perspective.
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26 Rorty’s historicist  perspective claims that what the philosopher (and the historian of
philosophy, for that matter) does is to reinterpret and translate such topics and language
to the effect that they become relevant in his conversation. That is what Rorty means
when he says that the philosopher cannot expect to produce writing which is not itself
recontextualizable in many ways. That is precisely the appeal Rorty finds in philosophy:
the possibilities it offers for permanent recontextualization and interpretation:
The most that an original figure can hope to do is to recontextualize his or her
predecessors.  He  or  she  cannot  aspire  to  produce  works  that  are  themselves
uncontextualizable, any more than a commentator like myself can aspire to find the
one “right” context into which to fit those works. (Rorty 1991: 2)
27 Given such appeal to interpretation through generations of philosophers, it is necessary,
in  order  to  keep  the  dialogue  flowing,  to  appeal  to  the  context  in  which  a  certain
philosophical  problem  develops;  therefore,  there  seems  to  be  no  possibility  of
recontextualization without  an  appeal  to  context.  When  approaching  a  philosophical
problem, the philosopher, as well as the historian of philosophy, needs to enquiry as to
how far the beliefs of previous philosophers who dealt with that problem permeate the
problem itself. In other words, what is to be done is an exercise similar to that of Dewey’s
in The Quest for Certainty,  where the philosopher approaches humanity’s philosophical
journey from within the social and cultural history in which it has developed.
 
The Entanglement Between the Public and the Private
28 With what has been said above I hope to have clarified some points about Rorty’s claim
that philosophical creativity arises in the void. Now I shall examine Rorty’s ironic claim
that the public and the private spheres are not to be consequently united.
29 As  was  remarked  above,  Rorty  considered  futile  the  Platonic  drive  to  make  a
comprehensive unit out of the public and private spheres. Such yearning, he tells us, ends
up in metaphysical antinomies which do not reflect adequately people’s lives and do not
help in coping with life’s most important problems:
There is no way to bring self-creation together with justice at the level of theory.
The  vocabulary  of  self-creation  is  necessarily  private,  unshared,  unsuited  to
argument. The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for
argumentative  exchange…  The  one  tells  us  that  we  need  not  speak  only  the
language  of  the  tribe,  that  we  may  find  our  own  words, that  we  may  have  a
responsibility to ourselves to find it. The other tells us that that responsibility is not
the only one we have. Both are right, but there is no way to make both speak a
single language. (Rorty 1989: xiv)
30 The ironist – who, according to Rorty, is someone who doubts final vocabularies and its
own vocabulary – finds inconsistencies in private and public discourse and cannot find a
coherent and nonmetaphysical way to make them coincide; for him, “searches for a final
vocabulary are not destined to converge” (Rorty 1989: 76).
31 After  reading  these  passages,  and  after  considering  what  was  said  above  about  the
detached ironist  philosopher,  one might retain the impression that  Rorty considered
philosophers  such  as  Nietzsche,  Heidegger,  and  Wittgenstein  as  expressing  their
philosophical thoughts from a solipsistic stance, using a private language. However, one
must ask again: is this really a consequence Rorty was willing to admit? Again, as was
remarked above, and as any reader of Rorty knows, this is of course not a consequence
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which he  would have upheld,  since  he  strongly  promoted the idea  of  philosophy as
cultural  politics.  But  then,  why  the  insistence  on  private  vocabularies  and  on  the
separation  between  public  and  private  spheres?  This  is  an  inconsistency  in  Rorty’s
philosophy which needs to be looked upon. In what follows I offer two approaches to
bridge such inconsistency.
32 First, I propose that we pay attention to Rorty’s definition of the ironist. For hi m, the
ironist is someone who fulfills three conditions:
(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently
uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as
final  by  people  or  books  she has  encountered;  (2)  she  realizes  that  argument
phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor resolve these doubts;
(3) in so far as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her
vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that is in touch with a power not herself.
(Rorty 1989: 73)
33 Some critics, like John Horton, find it difficult to make sense of the ironist’s worries, since
she must use the vocabulary of “right” and “wrong,” a vocabulary which, as Horton sees
it, cannot be linked with Rorty’s anti-foundationalism:
Once we dispense with there being something which answers to the description ‘the
right tribe,’ ‘the right language game,’ and ‘the right sort of human being,’ what is
there for the ironist to worry about? (Horton 2001: 21)
34 For Horton, dispensing with foundationalism necessarily means getting rid of terms such
as  “right”  and  “wrong,”  therefore,  the  ironist  is  not  really  worrying,  but  merely
expressing a personal preference of having been born in a different tribe and playing a
different language game. However, this move is unnecessary, since accepting Rorty’s anti-
foundationalism doesn’t  necessarily imply falling into relativism. The ironist  can still
speak of “right” and “wrong,” but only in a creative and innovative sense, a sense in
which  standard  moral  commitments  are  challenged.  As  a  creative  individual  the
philosopher can still retain such talk of being mistaken or not, since he speaks of new and
– until now – unimag ined extensions for such words.
35 A second approach for making sense of Rorty’s insistence on the philosopher’s apparent 
private language and the separation between the public and private spheres, consists on
shifting  the  attention  towards  the  important  role  imagination  played  in  Rorty’s
philosophy and account of creativity. For him, “imagination creates the games that reason
proceeds to play... In this sense, imagination has a priority over reason” (Rorty 2007: 115). For
Rorty imagination sets  the bounds of  thought,  giving rise  to language and concepts.
However, Rorty insisted, one must not think of imagination
as  a  faculty  that  generates  mental  images  but  as  the  ability  to  change  social
practices by proposing advantageous new uses of marks and noises… On this view,
expressions like ‘gravity’ and ‘inalienable human rights’ should not be thought of as
names of entities whose nature remains mysterious, but as noises and marks, the
use  of  which  by  various  geniuses  have  given  rise  to  bigger  and  better  social
practices. (Rorty 2007: 107-8)
36 The  history  of  philosophy  is,  for  Rorty,  the  history  of  original  and  appealing  ideas
developed by very imaginative intellectuals. In those intellectuals Rorty recognizes the
imaginative and creative drive of the poet, who sees himself as writing a poem in answer
to his predecessors:
Nietzsche  thought  that  Plato’s  success  in  putting  the  term  ‘really  real’  into
circulation was a great imaginative achievement. But the answer to a poem is still a
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better poem, and that is what Nietzsche thought of himself as writing. (Rorty 2007:
117)
37 I am not going to push further Rorty’s metaphor of philosophy as poetry, since he himself
wrote plenty about it.10 Rather, I want to come back to the issue between the supposed
incommensurability between the public and the private spheres using as a guide the two
previous quotations.
38 The problem which concerns us now is the problem of the supposed private language and
discourse which Rorty attributes to the philosopher (at least to the most creative ones).
For Rorty, the private language of the ironist doesn’t have any kind of impact on the
public discourse, since it springs from different sources and its terms are unshared and
unsuited to argument. However, one cannot but disagree with such opinion after reading
the last two passages, in which a relation between the public and the private are made
explicit. The clarity of this is such, that Rorty himself acknowledges it a few lines later,
where, after describing imagination as setting the bounds of thought and as the spring of
social  change  through  the  original  use  of  marks  and  noises,  he  points  that  such
imagination is bounded by practicality and common intentionality:
To  be  imaginative,  as  opposed  to  being  merely  fantastical,  one  must  both  do
something new and be lucky enough to have that novelty adopted by one’s fellows –
incorporated into their ways of doing things. The distinction between fantasy and
imagination is between novelties that do not get taken up and put to use by one’s
fellows and those that do. People whose novelties we cannot appropriate and utilize
we call foolish, or perhaps insane. Those whose ideas strike us as useful we hail as
geniuses. That is why people like Socrates and Nietzsche often seemed like lunatics
to some of their contemporaries and like heroes to others. (Rorty 2007: 107)
39 Thus considered, the philosophical creative enterprise becomes entirely different from
the detached and solipsistic endeavor suggested by Rorty in his Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity.  As opposed to the idea of  a detached genius whose language is exclusively
private,  one  finds  in  this  last  quote  the  entanglement  between  enlightened  private
individuals and their fellow human beings. This quote shows how individual imagination
sets the path for public discourse, and that such imagination cannot be solipsistic and
“fantastic” if it wishes to get any acknowledgement besides its own creator. Such creative
geniuses, like Socrates and Newton, and Kant and Dewey, have produced appealing ideas
which were bounded not by language or a conceptual scheme (since according to this
view it is them who are coming up with concepts), but by their practicality.
 
“The Trail of the Human Serpent…”
40 It is pragmatically convenient to hold philosophy as a set of tools which helps us cope
with  different  problems  as  they  come to  us  in  history.  One  cannot  expect  that,  for
example,  Wittgenstein  would  be  an  appropriate  answer  to  all  of  culture’s  and
philosophy’s problems,11 just  as Dewey is  far from answering all  of  our philosophical
yearnings. In philosophy, just as in any other areas of culture, we not only find pleasure
in variety, but wisdom too. This idea of philosophy as a toolbox is not incompatible with
William James’  claim that  “the trail  of  the human serpent is  over all”:  Wittgenstein,
Heidegger and Dewey all were nothing but human beings, all too contingent, fragile and
erring human beings. It is according with the classical pragmatism of James and Dewey to
acknowledge  the  philosopher’s  humanity  and  contingency,  and  it  doesn’t  harm
philosophy (at least the idea of philosophy which Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Rorty shared)
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– or makes it an “impure” discipline – to start recognizing the trail of the human serpent in
the best of philosophical writing; after all, philosophy is a human science in which the
author – as opposed to the exact sciences – cannot be detached from its creation.
41 With this  I  am not expecting to claim that  philosophers should psychoanalyze other
philosophers as individuals (such field, though not totally barren, I do not regard as a task
for philosophers, psychoanalysts could do that much better!12) and explain the existence
of philosophical ideas as mere contingent results of individual psyches. Rather, I expect
to claim that it is about time philosophers start to acknowledge the importance of History
and holism when it comes to write philosophy. Rorty has taught us that the Platonic
yearning for unity is impossible, and, at most, undesirable; now it is time to take Rorty’s
teaching to another level and start truly seeing the philosopher as a child of his own time.
42 It  is  possible,  though,  that  one may criticize  such approach as  denying any role  for
creativity in philosophical writing: if thought is limited and conditioned by a historical
framework then it is impossible to think outside of such framework. Nevertheless, my
reconstruction of Rorty’s approach to creativity doesn’t go that far as claiming that all
thought  is  determined  by  social  conditions,  denying  thus  the  space  for  individual
creativity. As was said above, the best philosophical thought is produced by individuals
who see themselves as writing not just a poem, but a practical  narrative which they
expect  to  be  adopted  by  their  fellows.  However,  as  Spinoza13 and  (more  than  two
centuries later) the classical pragmatists saw it, man is not as free as he wishes to be; our
thoughts and actions do not happen in the void, but are causally entrenched with the
conditions which surround them. For Spinoza, man’s thoughts and actions are bounded
and causally occasioned by nature; and by nature Spinoza understood not only God, but
reality as a whole (which of course includes human society); that is why he rejected the
Cartesian idea of an all capable free will. However, nature itself allows man enough power
to free himself from causes external to him, thus giving him the possibility to free himself
from natural servitude. This idea is not totally foreign to pragmatism, since pragmatists
such as James, Dewey, and Rorty, also welcomed the idea of thought and action as strictly
social enterprises thus acknowledging the importance of private creativity in the service
of  public  understanding.  Rorty  himself  acknowledges  such  limits  of  creativity  and
language by insisting on doing philosophy from a historical perspective. Thus, he quotes
Lorenz  Krüger  approvingly  when  he  criticized  “the  assumption  that  philosophy  is
characterized by a specific set of tasks which remain constant through history” (Krüger quoted
in Rorty 1998: 278). Krüger and Rorty agreed on the importance of holism in science and
philosophy, the importance of recognizing that “the discovery, as well as the justification of
an advanced theory requires the predecessor theory,  or rather the chain or net of predecessor
theories” (Rorty 1998: 278). Thus, Rorty continues, “this historicity gives one reason to doubt
that the history of philosophy can be written independently of cultural history” (Rorty 1998: 278).
43 One cannot but agree with Rorty that, in the end, what philosophers do, at least those
who are most remembered, is to change the subject of the conversation and the terms in
which such conversation is carried. Rorty saw that very clearly, though he, as a child of
his own time – namely, the analytic age – sometimes kept a certain respect for philosophy
as a discipline untainted from social contingencies; thus, as I tried to claim, he was never
able to fully acknowledge the overreaching trail of the human serpent.
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NOTES
1. See the Introduction to Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, and “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids.”
2. See the essays in his Essays on Heidegger and Others, Philosophical Papers vol. 2; and “Pragmatis
m and Romanticism” in Philosophy as Cultural Politics, Philosophical Papers, vol. 4.
3. “On Heidegger’s Nazism” (Rorty 1999: 190-97).
4. The case of Wittgenstein is particularly interesting, since his last writing, On Certainty, was cle
arly inspired by his discussions with and the writings of G.E. Moore regarding the problem of ske
pticism about the external world.
5. The idea that “life” is something totally independent and separated from philosophy was clearl
y stated by A. J. Ayer when he remarked to Isaiah Berlin that “philosophy is linguistic analysis, th
e rest is life.” See A. J. Ayer’s Part Of My Life.
6. See “The Contingency of Philosophical Problems: Michael Ayers on Locke” in Rorty 1998.
7. This passage by John Dewey is quoted by Rorty in his 1998: 276.
8. See Rorty’s preface to Philosophy as Cultural Politics.
9. I do not believe that Rorty was aware that by holding his main ironic thesis of Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity he would deny his other Hegelian thesis of the philosopher as a child of his ow
n time.
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10. See particularly “Philosophy as science, metaphor, and as politics” in Rorty 1991; and “Pragm
atism and Romanticism” in Rorty 2007.
11. Unfortunately, a quick bibliographical search will show that many commentators of Wittgens
tein hope to find in him a correct answer to all of culture’s problems, something similar as Aristo
tle was for the medieval mind.
12. Nevertheless, the writings of Steven Shapin have promoted a fruitful and rewarding sociologi
cal approach to the history of philosophic and scientific ideas. See Shapin 2010.
13. By linking Spinoza’s idea of freedom with classical pragmatism I expect to be doing – rather
than making a historical mistake – what Rorty saw himself as doing throughout his philosophical lif
e, namely, “trying to coax pairs of philosophers into each other’s arms- sometimes to their discomfort and
annoyance.” “Rorty’s Intellectual Autobiography,” in Auxier & Hahn 2010.
ABSTRACTS
In this essay I propose a criticism of Richard Rorty’s dualism between the public and the private.
According to Rorty’s  ironic utopia,  the intellectual  should not try to fuse public  and private
drives, since both spring from different sources and are qualitatively incompatible. Thus, Rorty’s
utopia consists in a radical irreconcilability between private intellectuals who create their own
language and the general public for which such language has little to no impact. In this essay,
however,  I  argue  that  Rorty’s  ironic  proposal  is  not  consistent  since:  1)  Rorty  himself
acknowledges that the vocabulary and imagination of private intellectuals, such as Socrates and
Galileo,  eventually  –  if  it  is  appealing  enough –  becomes  the  canon;  and  2)  because  Rorty’s
conception of philosophy, which he shares with the classical pragmatists, does not allow the idea
of a philosophical problem as not making a difference in practice, which is the case with the
problems with which is concerned the creative philosopher of Rorty’s utopia. As opposed to such
detached idea of philosophical creativity, I argue that, as the classical pragmatists claimed, all
philosophical thought,  in order to account as a practical difference, is relational,  and not,  as
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